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1. Introduction 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
Douglas H. Graham 
Specialized credit institutions have received particular 
attention from governments and international funding agen-
cies in the last decade. Donors see these institutions as a 
financial innovation capable of increasing the flow of 
internal and external finance to selected sectors and client 
groups within the economy. Concern about rural poverty, 
food self-sufficiency and low agricultural productivity, 
together with the belief that governments should promote 
agricultural modernization have led to the creation of these 
specialized institutions, characterized by a loan portfolio 
highly concentrated in agriculture and a limited scope for 
the provision of other banking services (Von Pischke, 
Heffernan and Adams). 
Large amounts of targeted funds have been channelled 
through these agricultural development banks from govern-
ments and donor agencies. These funds are invariably lent 
out at concessionary interest rates, a practice that contri-
butes to the fragmentation of credit markets in low income 
countries. Until recently, little attention had been given 
to the costs of financial intermediation associated with 
these special credit projects or lines of credit. It has 
been assumed that these costs are negligible, with little 
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effect on the behavior of the intermediaries or their 
clients. Recent research, however, has highlighted the 
importance of transaction costs associated with different 
stages of the intermediation process in many low income 
countries.!/ 
Financial intermediation costs can be identified at 
three levels: (1) expenses incurred by depositors in 
searching for a depository institution and making deposits; 
(2) resources used by the intermediary in servicing deposits 
and other funds, and in handling loan transactions; and (3) 
costs incurred by borrowers in negotiating, obtaining and 
repaying loans. In this study we concentrate on the costs 
borne by the intermediary and the relationship between these 
operational costs and loan targeting or end-use require-
ments. In particular we will document and analyze the 
effects of targeted funds on the intermediation costs of 
BANADESA, the National Agricultural Development Bank of 
Honduras (hereafter referred to as the ADB) and a major 
private commercial bank (referred to as the PCB) in the same 
country. We show that loan targeting requirements imposed 
on lenders have significant cost-increasing effects on their 
operations. 
It is useful to distinguish between two effects of loan 
targeting on lender's costs. The first effect is comprised 
!7 Several essays on these subjects appear in Adams, Graham 
and Von Pischke. See also Nyanin, and Saito and 
Villanueva. 
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of the direct costs of additional accounting and record-
keeping personnel and materials necessary to comply with the 
reporting requirements of special credit programs. These 
direct costs would also include all additional personnel 
(agronomists, livestock specialists, etc.) specifically 
hired and trained to service the project's clientele or 
target-groups. Increased costs due to loan monitoring and 
supervision are also classified under this first category. 
Second, there is an indirect (or less visible) effect 
derived from the impact of interest-rate ceilings and spe-
cial loan rates that accompany targeted funds. These 
constraints on the usual practice of loan-rate differen-
tiation force lenders to establish complicated loan proce-
dures in order to discriminate between potential borrowers 
with different degrees of risk. These regulatory-induced 
loan procedures generate further costs for both lenders and 
borrowers, in addition to the direct costs of loan 
targeting. In what follows, however, we shall focus on the 
direct or visible effects of targeted funds on the inter-
mediation costs of the banks in question. 
We first present a brief background and methodological 
discussion of the procedures used in the study. The next 
section documents the performance of targeted funds over 
time in the agricultural development bank (ADB) and analyzes 
their effects on portfolio composition and costs. We then 
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present the results of a comparative analysis of inter-
mediation costs between the ADB and the comparable private 
commercial bank (PCB) in Honduras. This comparison 
underscores the impact of special credit projects from 
international donors on the lending costs of both institu-
tions. In the final section we draw out the major conclu-
sions of our analysis. 
2. Background and Methodology 
The Honduran financial system has been working under 
different regulatory schemes during the last decade. These 
have included interest-rate ceilings, manipulation of 
reserve requirements, and loan targeting, among other forms 
of intervention. Recent years have been characterized by 
increasing rates of inflation and a decreasing trend in the 
overall level of liquidity in the system, due mainly to the 
growing share of the public sector in total domestic credit 
(Graham and others). There are 16 commercial banks, 2 
government-owned development banks and several savings and 
loan institutions in Honduras. The two banks involved in 
our study account for over one-quarter of the value of all 
new loans made by Honduran banks, and nearly half of the 
value of new formal loans made for agricultural purposes. 
Agricultural loans account for about three-quarters of the 
value of the ADB's loan portfolio, and for about one-seventh 
of the value of the PCB's loans. 
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Two different though complementary approaches are 
utilized in this study to document and analyze the effects 
of loan targeting on the costs of financial intermediation. 
First, we consider the behavior of the different sources of 
funds that finance the loan portfolio of the ADB in the 
period 1971-1982, and discuss their effects on portfolio 
composition and the ADB's administrative costs. The metho-
dological approach adopted for this analysis is described in 
section 2.1. Secondly, we investigate the contrasting 
features of the ADB's costs as compared to the PCB's costs, 
focusing on their relationships with the different degree of 
reliance upon external funds observed in the two banks. The 
methodology utilized in this comparative study is outlined 
in section 2.2. 
2.1 sources of Funds and Costs for the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB) 
Our analysis of the performance of targeted funds and 
their effects on the ADB's intermediation costs relies upon 
data for 28 branches of this bank over the 12-year period 
1971-1982. We discuss the behavior of the changing shares 
of different sources of funds in the loan portfolio and the 
change in portfolio composition using descriptive tables and 
correlation analysis. we then specify a cost function for 
the ADB, that is used as the basis for the assessment of the 
effects of targeted funds on the bank's intermediation 
costs. 
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The bank's cost function is derived assuming that the 
financial intermediary minimizes costs, C, subject to the 
constraint of a function that relates the production of 
banking services, Q, to the use of productive factors and 
inputs, x. (i=l, ••• ,n). The model can be summarized as 
~ 
follows: 
n 
minimize C = .L pi X. ~=1 ~ , cost equation, 
subject to 
, production function, 
where pi (i=l, ••• ,n) represents factor prices. 
( 1) 
(2) 
The solution of the system formed by equations (1), (2) 
and the first-order conditions for cost minimization yields 
a cost function that depends on the "output" level Q and 
factor prices, Pi• 
(3) 
This same approach underlies other empirical studies on 
banking costs and economies of scale in banking (Benston, 
Hanweck and Humphrey, Gheen). 
We introduce the effect of loan targeting in equation 
(3) by assuming that the total demand for every factor of 
production Xi, can be decomposed into two parts: (a) Xil' 
which corresponds to the level of Xi consistent with an 
unregulated environmentr and (b), Xi2' an additional quan-
tity of resources or a differential skill that is required 
under the targeting scheme. This corresponds to what we 
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defined as direct or visible effects of targeted funds in 
Section 1. We hypothesize that the effect of targeted 
funds on costs in the case of a development bank can be 
described as including a "ratchet" effect. This means that 
the increased level of costs growing out of a new credit 
project contracted by the bank does not decline to the pre-
viously existing cost level once the loan funds have been 
disbursed to the ultimate borrowers. Additional resources 
are hired or purchased at the beginning of the project in 
order to comply with the project's targeting requirements, 
but these resources are not laid off or sold once the funds 
are exhausted. The cost function will thus incorporate a 
set of variables, S, that capture the effect of targeted 
funds under the "ratchet" effect hypothesis: 
C = 1? ( Q, Pl' • • • , Pn' S ) • (4) 
Only resource costs are included in the dependent 
variable of this cost function. They were measured as total 
administrative costs, net of depreciation and provisions for 
bad debt, obtained from the annual income-expenditure state-
ments of the branches. Cost function (4) was specified as a 
generalized power function (DeJanvry) and estimated through 
OLS using different definitions of output and alternative 
specifications for the effect of the targeting indicators 
(S). The results of the regression analysis are presented 
and discussed in Section 3. 
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2.2 Comparative Study of Development Bank and Private 
Bank Costs: Methodology 
Our comparative analysis of the level and structure of 
lending costs of the agricultural development bank and ~he 
private commercial bank also focused on the non-financial 
(administrative) costs of both banks. Risk-related costs 
such as provision for bad debt were excluded from the analy-
sis given the different criteria applied by the accounting 
units of the two institutions. A representative sample of 
branches was selected in both cases, accounting for 55% of 
the loan portfolio and for 49% of total non-financial costs 
in the case of the ADB. ~hese percentages were 86% and 88% 
respectively in the PCB case. 
The 1981 income-expenditure statements of the branches 
were the basis for our cost estimates. The identification 
of the expenses related directly to credit operations and 
the functional breakdown of these costs were based on 
branch-level surveys undertaken separately in both institu-
tions during 1982. These surveys consisted of a set of 
questionnaires administered by the authors in interviews 
with branch managers, credit officials, agronomists, credit 
analysts, accounting personnel and clerical employees. The 
results of this comparative cost analysis of the effects of 
targeting are presented and analyzed in Section 4. 
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3. Loan Targeting and Intermediation Costs in the 
Agricultural Development Bank 
T1-:.roughout our analysis we identify targeted funds as 
those obtained by the bank from the central bank or from 
foreign donor agencies. Central bank funds correspond typi-
cally to crop-specific lines of credit designed to provide 
short-term financing to small and medium-size farmers. 
Foreign funds usually come in the form of special projects 
targeted to specific activities, and tend to include a 
larger proportion of long-term loans. 'I'"he term "external 
funds" will be used to refer to both central bank and 
foreign funds combined. The other, non-targeted, source of 
funds for the ADB refers to demand, savings and time 
deposits largely from public-sector institutions, and to a 
lesser extent from the public at large. 
so~rces of Funds and P~~~folio ~omposition 
The shares of different sources of funds in the ADB's 
portfolio of new loans for the period 1971-1982 are pre-
sented in table 1. The proportion of the total value of new 
loans {or loan amount) funded through deposit mobilization 
has decreased from an average of 56% in the period 1971-1974 
to an average of 43% in the last four years. Consequently, 
external funds (central bank and foreign funds combined) 
have increased their share in loan amounts from a 
44%-average in the first four years to a 57%-average for the 
period 1979-1982. Foreign funds were predominant among 
Table 1. Shares of Different Sources of Funds in the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 
Portfolio of New Loans, and Average Loan Size by Source, 1971-1982. 
Source of Funds 
Central Bank and 
Foreign Funds 
Deposits Central Bank Foreign Funds Combined 
Share in Share in Average Share in Share Average Share in Share in Average Share in Share in 
No. of Loan Loan No. of in Loan Loan No. of Loan Loan No. of Loan 
Year 
Loans Amount Size I Loans Amount Size Loans Amount Size Loans Amount 
% % Lps • .!. % % ~- _ _ % % Lps. % % 
1971 64.5 64.7 1223 0 0 35.5 35.3 1217 35.5 35.3 
1972 32.0 53.4 2215 0 0 68.0 46.6 910 68.0 46.6 
1973 24.9 54.6 3318 3.7 0.5 208 71.4 44.9 953 75.1 45.4 
1974 19.6 51.5 3348 41.0 8.9 276 39.4 39.6 1282 80.4 48.5 
1975 19.6 39.8 2236 43.2 20.0 507 37.2 40.2 1188 80.4 60.2 
1976 30.4 56.1 2679 9.0 12.1 1942 60.6 31.8 760 69.6 43.9 
1977 31.9 64.5 4528 22.5 14.7 1464 45.7 20.8 1021 68.2 35.5 
1978 10.4 33.0 8976 76.1 35.2 1306 13.5 31.8 6608 89.6 67.0 
1979 7. 7 46.2 17953 80.4 33.8 1256 11.9 20.0 5027 92.3 53.8 
1980 5.9 34.7 15107 79.2 40.5 1312 14.9 24.8 4293 94.1 65.3 
1981 4.3 42.1 22496 77.2 36.5 1036 18.5 21.4 2641 95.7 57.9 
1982 5.0 49.8 27238 63.5 30.2 995 31.5 20.0 1729 95.0 50.2 
Source: BANADESA, Economic Studies Department • 
.!.I 1 US$ = 2 lempiras 
1-' 
0 
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exte~nal sources during the first half of the period under 
analysis, while gradually decreasing in importance within 
this group after 1975. Central bank funds became the most 
important component among external funds in the second half 
of the period. 
The share of deposits in the number of loans decreased 
drastically from an average of over 40% in the first four 
years of the period to a remarkably small 5%-average in the 
last four years, reflecting the re-allocation of these funds 
to increasingly larger-sized loans. The relationship 
between the average size of loans granted out of deposits 
and the average size of loans funded by external sources 
grew from about 3:1 in the early 70's to over 7:1 in the 
early 80's (see table 1). 
The increased share of external sources of funds both 
in the number of loans and in the value of loans would 
suggest that agriculture as a whole, and especially small 
farmers, have increased their share in the ADB's portfolio 
of new loans. The loan-size figures presented in table 1 
and the shares of agricultural loans in the ADB's portfolio 
shown in table 2 allow an examination of the degree to which 
loan targeting has been effective in modifying the com-
position of the ADB's loan portfolio. 
Data on loans by farm size are not available for the 
period under discussion here, therefore we use the average 
loan sizes report~d in table 1 as a reasonable proxy. It is 
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Table 2. Shares of Agriculture Loans in The ADB 
Portfolio of New Loans, 1971-1982. 
Total Agriculture 
CrOES Livestock (CroEs + Livestock) 
Share I Share I Share Share 
,........ 
Share in Share • l.n J..n l.n J..n l.n 
No. of Loan No. of Loan No. of Loan 
Loans Amount Loans Amount Loans Amount 
Year % % % % % % 
1971 74.3 40.1 23.6 27.5 97.9 67.6 
1972 70.7 43.2 25.7 30.2 96.4 73.4 
1973 67.7 46.5 27.4 29.6 95.1 76.1 
1974 83.9 62.6 13.9 19.8 97.8 82.4 
1975 88.8 74.2 8.8 13.6 97.6 87.8 
1976 86.1 61.3 12.4 13.8 98.5 75.1 
1977 79.8 79.2 14.4 12.6 94.2 91.8 
1978 89.1 85.2 9.3 7.1 98.4 92.3 
1979 91.4 76.0 7.0 6.7 98.4 82.7 
1980 96.7 72.4 1.5 3.9 98.2 76.3 
1981 94.7 57.3 3.8 8.4 98.5 65.7 
1982 93.1 68.2 5.4 8.5 98.5 76.7 
Source: BANADESA, Economic Studies Department. 
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clear from these figures that the average loan size serviced 
by external funds has not changed substantially over the 
period 1971-1982. This, in turn, suggests that the share of 
small loans in the portfolio of new loans has not experi-
enced significant variations in this period. On the other 
hand, the share of loans to agriculture (crops + livestock) 
in the ADB's portfolio (table 2) by the early 80's was at 
the same level of the early 70's, about 70% of the total 
value of new loans. The highest shares are observed in 
1977-1978, when agricultural loans accounted for over 90% of 
the portfolio. Within agriculture, crop loans have in 
general increased their share of new loans, while the share 
of livestock loans 96 has decreased steadily since 1972. 
In short, the increasing share of external funds, 
through the period under analysis, has not been associated 
with an increased share of agricultural loans in the port-
folio. The peak years of 1977-1978 may be better explained 
by real-sector phenomena such as the "coffee boom" rather 
than by an increased proportion of the bank's loan funds 
being supplied by external sources under targeting arrange-
ments. These findings are reinforced by the results of the 
correlation analysis between the shares of sources of funds 
in the portfolio and the share of agricultural loans. 
None of the sources of funds showed a statistically 
significant correlation with total agricultural loans. The 
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correlation coefficients between external funds (combined or 
separate) and agricultural loans were not statistically dif-
ferent from zero, either taking the shares in the number of 
loans or the shares in the value of new loans. Significant 
coefficients were found only when correlating the shares of 
different sources of funds with the shares of the components 
of total agricultural loans, i.e., crops and livestock. 
Table 3 summarizes these results, showing the specialization 
of external funds in terms of the activities financed, 
central bank funds primarily financing crop entreprises and 
foreign funds focusing on livestock activities. 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients between 
the shares of the different sources of funds in the port-
folio of new loans. There is a high negative correlation 
between central bank funds and foreign funds, showing that 
these external sources have been substituting for each other 
during the period under analysis. Central bank funds have 
been also compensating for the decline in importance of 
deposits as a source of funds, as denoted by the negative 
correlation between these two sources. 
These findings may be summarized as follows: (a) the 
growing share of external sources of funds (largely directed 
towards agriculture) has not been reflected in a significant 
change in the relative role of agricultural loans in the 
portfolio. The fungibility of finance is at work here, with 
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficients Between Sources 
of Funds and/New Loans to Agriculture 
in the ADB.l 
Source of Funds 
Loans to De;eosits Central Bank Foreisn 
A9:riculture Number Amount Number Amount Number 
Cro;es~/ 
Number -0.36 0.38 -0.32 
Amount -0.25 0.33 
Livestocldf 
Number 0.44 -0.48 0.41 
Amount 0.31 -0.42 
1/ All coefficients significant at .01 level. 
2/ N = 283 
}_/ N = 292 
Funds 
Amount 
-0.28 
0.36 
Table 4. 
Source 
of Funds 
Deposits 
Number 
Amount 
Central Bank 
Number 
Amount 
Foreign Funds 
Number 
Amount 
16 
Correlation Coefficients Between Shares of 
Sources of Funds in the ADB Loan Portfolio.l/ 
Deposits 
Number Amount 
1. 
1. 
Source of Funds 
Central Bank 
Number Amount 
-0.85 
-0.79 
1. 
1. 
Foreign Funds 
Number Amount 
0.56 
0.13~/ 
-0.91 
-0.69 
l. 
1. 
!/ N ~ 299, all coefficients significant at .01 level, 
unless specified otherwise. 
~/ Significant at .05 level. 
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external funds substituting for own-deposit funds that have 
been transferred from agricultural to non-agricultural 
loans. (b) As a consequence targeting goals, in terms of 
the increased participation of the agricultural sector in 
the loan portfolio, have not been achieved; (c) the 
increased share of external funds may have induced the 
re-allocation of non-targeted funds to increasingly larger-
sized loans in the non-agricultural sector. This cost-
saving adjustment compensates for the increasing costs of 
handling a growing proportion of external funds in the 
"targeted" portion of the loan portfolio. 
The ADB Cost Function and the Effects of Loan Targeting 
The cost function derived in its general form in 
section 2.1 is specified as a power function that includes 
output, the price of labor services and the loan targeting 
indicators. Different definitions of output and different 
assumptions concerning the probable effect of targeting on 
costs have led us to create several specifications of the 
cost function. Output is defined alternatively as two 
separate services (loans, L, and deposits, D), or as the 
combination of the two jointly-produced services (loans plus 
deposits, Q). The total value of new loans granted each 
year, and the value of end-of-year deposit balances are 
utilized as the corresponding measures of the two services 
produced by the bank. 
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To deal with the effect of loan targeting, three dummy 
variables (Si,i=l,2,3) are defined to account for the effect 
of the three different sources of funds; deposits, central 
bank, and foreign funds. In order to capture the effect of 
targeted funds under our "ratchet" effect hypothesis (see 
section 2.1), Si's are defined so that Si > 0 if the value 
of funds coming from source i has increased with respect to 
the level observed in the previous year, otherwise Si = 0. 
A combined dummy variable, 823 is similarly defined to 
account for the effect of all external funds combined 
(central bank and foreign funds together). our "ratchet 
effect" hypothesis implies that a positive sign is expected 
in the coefficients of the Si variables that capture the 
effects of targeted funds, i.e., central bank and foreign 
funds. We consider the possibility that these effects may 
be lagged, particularly in the case of foreign donor funds, 
since this source of funding is often granted in the form of 
special projects with delayed period of disbursement and 
expenditures. 
These dummy variables representing the sources of funds 
enter the cost function in two alternative ways: (1) as a 
log-linear effect on the total cost function: and (2) as an 
interactive effect with the marginal cost of loans, or the 
marginal cost of total output, depending on the definition 
of output. External funds combined, and foreign funds alone 
were also specified with a one-year lag, to capture the 
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lagged effect increases in these sources of funds are likely 
to have on costs. 
As a result of the several forms of specifying output 
and.loan-targeting effects, we derived the following mathe-
matical forms for the cost function (4): 
Effect of 
Loan-Targeting 
(Source of 
funds) 
Output Specification 
Log-Linear 
Interactive 
Loans and Deposits 
as separate Outputs 
R ~ y:'J..a.s. 
C = o: U' D W 0 e 1 1 
Loans plus 
Deposits as a 
Combined Output 
c = o: Q 'w oe '-1. a is i 
where: c, is total administrative costs net of depreciation 
and provisions for bad debt 
L, is total value of new loans 
D, is total deposits balances 
W, is average monthly salary 
Q, is the sum of loans plus deposits 
si, are the dummy variables representing the sources 
of funds 
In each case, different combinations of Si's are 
estimated: 
(a) deposits, and external funds combined (central bank 
and foreign funds) 
(b) deposits, and lagged external funds 
(c) deposits, central bank, and lagged foreign funds 
Results of the regression analysis performed on the 
linearized versions of these functional forms are reported 
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in tables 5 through 7. Table 5 shows the estimated coef-
ficients and relevant statistics for the functional form 
that includes loans and deposits as separate variables, and 
specifies a log-linear effect of the sources of funds. 
Table 6 reports our results in the case of two separate out-
puts (loans and deposits), and interactive effects assumed 
for the sources of funds. Table 7 summarizes the results 
obtained with the definition of output as a combined product 
of loans plus deposits. The results of both log-linear and 
interactive specifications for the effects of sources of 
funds are reported in this table. In all equations the 
economic variables are measured in nominal terms. Results 
obtained with the variables expressed in real terms (not 
reported here) do not show any meaningful difference from 
those reported here. 
A general evaluation of the results presented in tables 
5 through 7 indicates that these specifications can be con-
sidered satisfactory from the statistical point of view. 
The equations with loans and deposits specified as separate 
variables show R-square values of 0.80 or 0.81 (tables 5 and 
6). These values appear somewhat lower (0.76, 0.77) in the 
case of the equations that include the combination of loans 
2lus deposits as the output variable (table 7). The coef-
ficients for output variables and average salary are posi-
tive and statistically significant at the .01 level in all 
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Table 5. Effects of Sources of Funds on ADB 
Intermediation Costs: Regression 
Results for Log-linear Effect. 
Functional Form: C :: a L fb lW 0e ;_ ai Si 
Explanatory Variables 
Loans (L) 
(new loans in Lp. '000) 
Deposits (D) 
(balances in Lp. '000) 
Wage Rate (W} 
(average salary, Lp.) 
Source of Funds (si) 
(dummy variables) 
Deposits 
Central Bank 
& Foreign Funds 
Lagged (Central Bank 
& Foreign) 
Central Bank 
Lagged Foreign Funds 
Intercept 
F-Value 
1 
0.4627* 
(0.0256) 
0.1321* 
{0.0309) 
0.6091* 
(0.1034) 
-0.0712+ 
( 0. 0338) 
-0.0257° 
(0.0517) 
4.8219* 
(0.4823) 
0.80 
229.51 
Equat~on Number 
2 
0.4540* 
(0.0251) 
0.1338* 
(0.0306) 
0.6416* 
(0.0977) 
-0.0789* 
{0.0311) 
0.1156* 
(0.0427) 
4.5894* 
{0.4396) 
0.81 
3 
0.4456* 
(0.0254) 
0.1324* 
(0.0305) 
0.6888* 
(0.0996) 
-0.0936* 
(0.0327) 
0.0511° 
(0.0423) 
0.1317* 
(0.0429) 
4.3658* 
(0.4525) 
0.81 
236.68 199.33 
OLS estimation with all variables in natural logs, excepting 
dummy variables. Standard errors in parenthesis, N = 288 in 
all equations. 
Significance levels: * .01. 
+ .05. 
o not significant at .20 level. 
Table 6. Effects of Sources 
Costs: Regression 
Functional Form: 
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of Funds on 
Results for 
C = a: L 
( ib + 
ADB Intermediation 
Interactive Effect. 
J'.;fi.S.} ~ 
..._
11 DW 0 
Equation Number 
~E~xAp~l~a~n~a~t~o~r·y~V~a~r~l.~·a~b~l~e~s~----------~1 ____________ 2 ___________ 3 
Loans (L) 
(new loans in Lp. '000) 
Deposits (D) 
(balances in Lp. '000) 
Wage Rate (W) 
(average salary, Lp.) 
Source of Funds (Si) 
(dummy variables) 
Deposits 
Central Bank 
& Foreign Funds 
Lagged (Central Bank 
& Foreign) 
Central Bank 
Lagged Foreign Funds 
Intercept 
F-Value 
0.4732* 
(0.0271) 
0.1327* 
(0.0309) 
0.6065* 
(0.1019) 
-0.0086+ 
(0.0045) 
-0.0021° 
(0.0069) 
4.7408* 
(0.4686) 
0.80 
228.95 
0.4534* 
(0.0251) 
0.134 7* 
(0.0305) 
0.6339* 
(0.0965) 
-0.0100* 
(0.0040) 
0.0169* 
(0.0056) 
4.6194* 
(0.4435) 
0.81 
237.98 
0.4427* 
(0.0261) 
0.1334* 
(0.0304) 
0.6784* 
(0.0981) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0042) 
0.0075x 
(0.0056) 
0.0179* 
(0.0056) 
4.4271* 
(0.4489) 
0.81 
200.00 
OLS estimation with all variables in natural logs, 
excepting dummy variables. Standard errors in parenthesis, 
N = 288 in all equations. 
Significance levels: * .01 
+ .05 
x not significant at .15 level. 
o not significant at .5 level. 
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Table 7. Effects of Sources of Funds on ADB Intermediation 
Costs: Regression Results with Total Output 
Defined as Loans plus Deposits. Log-Linear Effect 
and Interactive Effect. 
Equation Number 
1 2 3 4 
Log-linear effect 
"' z:.a. s. 
C = a: Q 'w ue ~ ~ ~ 
Interactive effect ()... + L;. ,\ • s . ) 
c = a: Q 0 ~ ~ ~ w 0 Explanatory Variables 
Total Output (Q) 
( Lp. I 000) 
Wage Rate (W) 
(average salary, Lp.) 
Source of Funds (Si) 
(dummy variables) 
Deposits 
Central Bank 
& Foreign Funds 
Lagged (Central Bank 
& Foreign) 
Intercept 
F-Value 
0.5919* 
{0.0341) 
0.7335* 
(0.1093) 
-0.8076+ 
(0.0371) 
-0.0016° 
(0.0566) 
3.7057* 
(0.5106) 
0.76 
226.99 
0.5849* 
(0.0333) 
0.7547* 
(0.1033} 
-0.0964* 
(0.0340) 
0.1304* 
(0.0466) 
3.5569* 
(0.4657) 
0.77 
235.22 
0.5905* 
(0.0355) 
0.7366* 
(0.1079) 
-0.0049x 
(0.0049) 
o.0088x 
(0.0074) 
3.6052* 
(0.4962) 
0.76 
225.53 
0.5848* 
(0.0330) 
0.7267* 
(0.1023) 
-0.0099+ 
(0.0044) 
0.0209* 
(0.0061) 
3.6783* 
(0.4734) 
0.77 
236.22 
OLS estimation with all variables in natural logs, excepting dummy 
variables. 
Standard errors in parenthesis, N = 288 in all equations. 
Significance levels: * .01. 
+ .05. 
x not significant at .2 level. 
o not significant at .5 level. 
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estimated equations. Furthermore, the values of the coef-
ficients associated with these variables are fairly stable 
across different specifications. 
The findings summarizing the effects of different 
sources of funds on costs are also significant and con-
sistent across equations, as outlined below: 
(i} In all equations the estimated coefficients for the 
dummy variables capturing the effects of external 
funds (central bank and/or foreign) are always 
algebraically larger than the coefficients associated 
with own-deposits. 
(ii) Own-deposits show a negative and significant effect on 
costs in all equations, with only one instance in 
which the negative sign is not statistically signifi-
cant (table 7, column 3). 
(iii) The effect of targeted funds combined (central bank 
plus foreign funds) are either positive or not signi-
ficantly different from zero. Non-significant 
coefficients are obtained when the current-year value 
of the dummy variable that captures the effect of 
these external funds is included in the equation 
(column 1 in tables 5 and 6, and columns 1 and 3 in 
table 7). However, when the lagged effect of external 
funds (central bank plus foreign} is specified in the 
cost equations, the estimated coefficients in all such 
equations show a positive sign and are statistically 
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significant at the 1% level. These results can be 
seen in column 2 of tables 5 and 6, and columns 2 and 
4 of table 7. 
(iv) When central bank and foreign donors are considered as 
separate sources of targeted funds (column 3 in tables 
5 and 6), the lagged effect of foreign funds is posi-
tive and significant, whereas the coefficient of the 
dummy variable for the central bank funds is not 
significantly different from zero. This result 
suggests that the order of magnitude of the cost 
effects of the three different sources of funds 
decreases from foreign funds to central bank funds to 
own-deposits. The first two sources of funds are 
cost-increasing, while the latter (own-deposits) is a 
cost-saving source of funds. 
(v) These results are qualitatively identical for the two 
alternative ways in which the source-of-funds 
variables enter the cost equation. The comparison of 
the estimated coefficients for these variables between 
the log-linear form (table 5) and the interactive form 
(table 6) only show differences in the magnitudes of 
the estimates. In the log-linear specification the 
different sources of funds affect the overall admi-
nistrative costs of the bank, without a direct effect 
on the marginal cost of lending. In the second set of 
equations, however, the sources of funds show a direct 
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effect on the marginal cost of lending as well. These 
costs decrease, ceterisparibus, when own-deposits 
increase in the liability portfolio of the bank. In 
contrast, the marginal cost of lending will increase 
when the additional liquidity comes from external 
sources. 
In summary, our results indicate that there is a 
lagged, "ratchet"-type effect of targeted funds on the 
intermediation costs of the agricultural development bank of 
Honduras. overall administration costs and the marginal 
costs of lending are increased as a result of additional 
funding received from external sources. This effect is more 
striking and significant in the case of foreign funds than 
in the case of rediscount lines of credit coming from the 
central bank. On the other hand, greater reliance on own-
deposits as a source of loan funds will have cost-saving 
effects on both overall intermediation costs and the margi-
nal cost of lending. 
4. Comparative Cost Analysis: The Agricultural 
Development Bank and a Private commercial Bank 
Administrative costs of Banks 
As shown in table B, the average agricultural loan made 
by the private commercial bank (PCB) used in our analysis 
was almost seven times as large as the ADB's loans. In 
part, this helps explain the sharp difference in average 
costs per unit of money lent by the two banks. Ignoring 
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loan defaults, loan transaction costs of the PCB were only 
2.5 percent of the value of its loans, compared to ADB costs 
of 8.4 percent (line 2).~/ Part of the dissimilarity in 
costs was also related to differences in the sources of 
funds for lending. In 1981 three-fifths of the money lent 
by the ADB came from rediscount lines with the Central Bank 
or from external aid donors, while only 7 percent of the 
PCB's liabilities were from these sources. Deposits made up 
91 percent of all the PCB's loanable funds, but only 40 per-
cent for the ADB. Accordingly, lending costs made up a much 
larger proportion of overall costs in the ADB than in the 
PCB, 77 percent versus 33 percent (line 3). These differen-
ces in the source of funds caused dissimilarities in the 
makeup of their costs, as will be seen shortly. 
It can also be noted (line 5) that more than three-
quarters of PCB's lending costs were incurred at the branch 
level, while only 43 percent of the ADB's lending costs 
occurred in its branches. The ADB's operations are much 
more centralized than those of the PCB's. The large inci-
dence of special lines of credit and externally funded pro-
jects in the ADB forced this centralization. The central 
office spends considerable time preparing reports to docu-
ment the targeted use of external funds, an activity that 
cannot be handled by branches. 
£/ In 1981, delinquency rates (loans overdue/total 
portfolio) were approximately 5% in the PCB, and 50% in 
the ADB. 
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Another major difference between the banks is found in 
the proportion of total administrative costs involved in 
salaries and other personnel costs (line 6). Because the 
ADB made much smaller loans and was required to be more con-
cerned with targeted objectives, one would have expected 
personnel costs to be relatively higher in the ADB than in 
the commercial bank. However, the opposite occurred. 
Personnel costs made up over 40 percent of the PCB's total 
administrative costs, but only a bit more than a quarter of 
the ADB's costs. The main explanation here is that the com-
mercial bank paid much higher salaries to their employees 
than did the development bank, in the expectation of higher 
levels of employee productivity. The information in table 8 
(lines 7-9) also shows that the PCB spends much more on loan 
evaluation, less on loan monitoring, and much more on loan 
recovery than does the ADB. These figures provide very 
strong insights into why the ADB has much more serious loan 
recovery problems than the PCB. The the ADB spends less 
time and effort extending and recovering loans than does the 
private bankl In doing so it also rewards its employees 
less than does the PCB. 
Donor and Government Funds 
Because the ADB receives a large part of its funds from 
the government or donor agencies through the central bank, 
only a small part (23 percent) of its total administrative 
29 
Table 8. Lending and Deposit Mobilization Costs in 
A Commercial Bank and A Development Bank 
in Honduras. 
------ --------------------------------~----~~~----~~-----Commercial Development 
Costs Bank Bank 
1. Average lending cost per Lps. 1,748!/ Lps. 26o!/ 
agricultural loan 
2. Average lending cost per 2.5 8.4 
lempira lent (%) 
3. Lending costs/overall costs (%) 33 77 
4. Costs of deposit mobilization 
and other services/overall 
costs (%) 67 23 
5. Branch level costs/ 
total lending costs (%) 
6. Personnel costs/ 
total lending costs (%) 
7. Loan evaluation costs/ 
total lending costs (%) 
8. Loan monitoring costs/ 
total lending costs (%) 
9. Loan recovery costs/ 
total lending costs (%) 
77 
41 
45 
4 
14 
Source: Bank income and expenditure statements and 
branch-level surveys. 
!/ 1 u.s. dollar ~ 2 lempiras 
43 
27 
16 
7 
6 
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costs result from non-lending efforts (line 4). The oppo-
site is true for the private bank. About two-thirds of its 
total administrative costs result from non-lending activi-
ties, mainly deposit mobilization. While the rediscounted 
funds from the central bank are usually extended to the ADB 
on concessionary terms, these funds are not cheap. In most 
cases these rediscount lines carry targeting, documenting 
and reporting requirements that impose a good deal of extra 
effort and cost on the ADB. 
To shed more light on the effect these external funds 
have on the loan transaction costs of the two banks, we 
documented the branch level costs for a sub-sample of the 
private bank branches that handled relatively large amounts 
of funds provided by an international donor. We were able 
to document and separate the lending costs incurred in 
managing the bank's own funds as well as targeted funds pro-
vided by the donor through rediscount facilities in the 
central bank by two loan size categories: less than 125 
thousand lempiras, and those of more than this amount. The 
donor funds were all targeted to agricultural loans of less 
than 125 thousand lempiras. The information we collected 
shows the costs incurred per loan and per lempira lent by 
the bank in handling the specified loan applications. (For 
the sub-sample of branches studied, central office costs add 
0.6 percent as an overhead cost to the branch level costs 
reported here.) 
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As can be noted in table 9, there were large differen-
ces in administrative costs by loan size groups. As 
expected, the large loans were less expensive to administer 
per unit of money lent than were the smaller loans. 
However, we found surprisingly large differences in the 
lending costs by end-use of funds. Even though the costs 
per loan did not show important variations across different 
end-uses, average loan-sizes by end-use ranged between 10 
thousand and 50 thousand lempiras. This implies important 
differences in the costs per lempira lent. While the pri-
vate bank loans of less than 125 thousand lempiras for 
industrial purposes only involved administrative costs of 
1.3 percent, loans for housing and real estate had costs 
reaching 7.2 percent. Loans made for agricultural purposes 
in the smaller loan size category had mid-range administra-
tive costs of 3.1 percent. 
The most interesting figure in the table is the admi-
nistrative cost per unit of money lent for the agricultural 
loans made from donor funds. These loans involved an 
average cost per loan operation five times as large as the 
costs of extending agricultural loans from the bank's own 
funds. Yet, the average size of donor-funded agricultural 
loans was more than twice the size of agricultural loans 
financed with the bank's own resources. As a result, branch 
costs of agricultural loans made from donor funds amounted 
Table 9. Private Commercial Bank Branch Lending Costs by Source 
of Funds, End-Use of Loans, and Loan Size. 
Source of 
Funds and End 
Use of Loans 
Bank's Own Funds 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Housing 
Commerce 
consumption 
Other 
Donor's Funds 
Agriculture 
Loan Size 
Less than L. 125,000 More than L. 125,000 
Average Average Cost per Average Average Cost per 
Cost per Loan Size Lempira Cost per Loan Lempira 
Loan (Lps.) (Lps.) Lent (%) Loan {Lps.) Size (LQs.) Lent (%) 
999 31,777 3.1 1,319 471,571 0.3 
642 48,542 1.3 850 364,17 3 0.2 
774 10,699 7.2 1,026 250,000 0.4 
642 39,672 1.6 850 250,200 0.3 
642 11,381 5.6 
642 39,090 1.6 850 257,440 0.3 
5,450 69,664 7.8 
source: surveys of selected bank branches. 
w 
I.'V 
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to 7.8 percent of the value of the loans made, more than 
twice the cost of agricultural loans extended fro1n other 
funds managed by the private bank. Adding central office 
overhead costs to branch expenses pushed the total admi-
nistrative costs on these agricultural loans to 8.4 percent. 
It is clear that the higher cost per unit of money lent in 
the case of the donor's funds do not result from a portfolio 
of small-sized loans. Instead, it is a result of a far more 
complicated and costly set of procedures associated with the 
administration of donor funds, as compared to the use of the 
bank's own funds. 
Again, ignoring default risks, the administrative costs 
on donor funds far exceeded the 3-4 percent spread allowed 
on these loans for administrative costs. Because of other 
larger profitable activities, the private bank can tolerate 
these administrative losses. Unless margins are increased, 
or administrative costs reduced, it is very unlikely that 
the private bank will be eager to becoming heavily involved 
in underwriting the large administrative costs of handling 
donor funds. In contrast, the ADB, being a government bank, 
does not have the freedom of choice to avoid the punishment 
involved in handling large amounts of targeted money. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study we have documented and analyzed the 
effects of targeted funds on the intermediation costs of the 
National Agricultural Development Bank and a major private 
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commercial bank of Honduras. Our results show that loan 
targeting requirements imposed on lenders have significant 
cost-increasing effects on their operations. 
We found that the increasing share of targeted funds 
for agriculture in the liability portfolio of the develop-
ment bank has not resulted in an increased participation of 
agricultural loans in the portfolio. Our analysis also 
suggests that this increased reliance on targeted funds has 
not had a significant effect on the average loan size of the 
bank's portfolio of new loans. These findings indicate that 
loan targeting has failed to meet the goals of an increased 
share for agricultural credit and an increased share of 
small sized (i.e. small farmer) loans in the loan portfolio. 
Regression analysis performed on the development-bank's 
cost function indicates that there is a lagged, "ratchet"-
type effect of targeted funds on the intermediation costs of 
the agricultural development bank. Overall administrative 
costs and the marginal costs of lending increase as a result 
of additional funding received from external sources. This 
effect is more striking and significant in the case of 
foreign funds than in the case of central bank rediscount 
lines. However, greater reliance on own-deposits as a 
source of loan funds will have cost-saving effects on both 
overall administrative costs and the marginal costs of 
lending. 
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The comparative cost study of the development bank and 
the private commercial bank reinforces the findings sum-
marizea auove. This study emphasizes the contrasts in the 
structure of lending costs and overall organization between 
the two banks. It is clear from the results of this com-
parative analysis that the source of funds these institu-
tions strongly influences their lending costs. The private 
bank, relying more on local deposits, is more cautious and 
efficient in evaluating and screening loans at the branch 
level and, in general, delegates more decision-making to 
branches. The public sector bank is far more centralized, 
with a heavy overlay of administrative costs associated with 
the loan targeting criteria of external sources of finance. 
However, even the more efficient private bank cannot avoid 
or reduce the high costs associated with on-lending from 
foreign source funds. 
In conclusion, loan targeting is largely ineffective in 
reaching its intended and desired goals. At the same time, 
targeted funds impose higher intermediation costs on lending 
institutions. International donors and local governments 
should seriously reconsider their loan-targeting policies 
in light of the significant cost-increasing effects these 
policies have on the financial intermediaries. 
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